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Abstract 
We illustrate how RCTs could be used as a learning tool to shed light on various aspects of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). Based on examples drawn from agricultural and social policies in developing 
and developed countries, we argue that the RCT toolbox has the potential to significantly add to 
existing approaches to evaluating and designing the CAP. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Despite the renewed demand for evaluating agricultural policies in the European Union and the revival 
of field experiments – also known as randomized controlled trials (RCTs) – in the evaluation of social 
policies in Europe since the mid-2000s, RCTs have not been applied to the evaluation of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) (Colen et al., 2016). This may seem surprising given the role played by RCTs 
during the “glory days” of agricultural economics until the 1960s (Herberich, Levitt and List, 2009). 
There are undoubtedly many reasons for this absence, both on the demand side (e.g. the type of 
evaluations requested or accepted by various stakeholders such as governments, international 
agencies, farmers, …) and on the supply side (e.g. the incentives available to and the backgrounds of 
the consultants and academics operating in this area). This paper abstracts from these constraints - 
each of which undoubtedly deserve careful analyses of their own -  and asks a more preliminary 
question: are RCTs an appropriate tool to address issues relevant to the design of today’s CAP?  
While evaluation can serve as both an accountability measure and as a learning tool, this paper focuses 
on its role as the latter, as RCTs can be particularly powerful instruments in improving our 
understanding of effective policies. For many aspects of the CAP, the important policy question to 
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address is not whether a certain type of policy ought to exist, but rather whether specific changes to 
the design of an existing policy could lead to better efficiency and/or equity outcomes. To the extent 
that such questions are of interest, RCTs can help provide rigorous answers by randomly introducing 
potentially relevant variations in the design and testing their implications for a policy’s effectiveness. 
We consider the two pillars of the CAP1, and highlight a (non-exhaustive) list of policy-relevant design 
issues that could arguably benefit from rigorous empirical evidence: (i) How could the uptake of agri-
environmental measures by farmers be increased? (ii) What schemes can induce coordination among 
farmers on environmental issues in which one farmer’s defection jeopardizes the efforts of all the 
others such? (iii) What implications could different mechanisms for direct payments have on efficiency 
and equity? (iv) How can we design agri-environmental contracts to ensure that farmers receive 
sufficient compensation for their conservation efforts without inducing large efficiency losses?  We 
then discuss how RCTs can shed light on these questions.  
The four policy design questions are meant to demonstrate the adaptability of RCTs: are they useful 
only for a narrow range of issues? It seems hardly surprising that, transposing and extending lessons 
drawn from the lab by behavioral economists, experiments on information-based interventions or 
other types of nudges can shed light on a farmer’s propensity to adopt agri-environmental contracts. 
One may be skeptical, however, about what can be learned from RCTs with respect to three other 
issues, namely coordination failures, equity – efficiency tradeoffs, and market design. Despite this, we 
believe that one of the key lessons that emerges from the recent literature that relies on field 
experiment is the strong adaptability of the RCT toolkit and its usefulness in addressing questions that 
had been deemed out of reach only a few years ago. To illustrate this claim, we complement the 
discussion of hypothetical experimental designs that could be applied to the CAP with actual examples 
from two related policy domains: agricultural policies in developing countries, and social policies in 
Europe and other contexts.  
Our exercise contributes to a small prospective literature on the role that experiments can play in the 
evaluation of agricultural policies. Heberich et. al (2009) build on observations over the past century 
to argue that agricultural economists could take “a new train at the depot,” in the form of field 
experiments inspired by laboratory experiments and economic theory. Colen et al. (2016) provide a 
detailed review of the state of the art in the evaluation of the CAP, and discuss the comparative 
advantages of different experimental methods, and their complementarities with other methods. Both 
papers take an optimistic view of the potential of the RCT toolbox while acknowledging that this 
potential has not yet been realized. To complement these discussions, we highlight potentially fruitful 
                                                          
1 The first pillar consists of direct payments to farmers and market measures, and the second pillar is a rural 
development policy aimed at balancing territorial development with sustaining a farming sector that is 
environmentally sound, while simultaneously fostering competitiveness and innovation. 
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examples of evaluations, inspired by recent successes in neighboring areas. The subsequent sections 
consider the four policy design questions in turn, and the last section offers several concluding 
remarks.  
 
2. Inducing behavioral changes: nudges and information-based 
experiments 
 
Farmers are involved in decisions with complex trade-off dynamics and sometimes lack all of the 
relevant information when considering engaging in new agricultural practices. The complexity and 
changing nature of some of the environmental regulations and policies, as well as the heterogeneity 
in conditions and constraints among many farmers in the EU, may well imply that some farmers are 
not necessarily aware of all the information and practices that may be relevant for their particular 
situation.2 This potentially is a bigger constraint among smaller (potentially part-time) farmers or 
certain farmers in newer member states. Whether such information constrains actually exists, and if 
so for whom, is clearly an empirical question. Targeting the provision of information regarding 
eligibility for certain benefits, or advantages of shifting practices, to certain types of farmers could help 
evaluate such questions.  
Even when farmers have access to all the relevant information, the complex and dynamic trade-offs 
they need to consider for many of their decisions may fosters the use of heuristics and a susceptibility 
to behavioral inertia and the status quo in agricultural practices. Insights from behavioral science 
suggests that “nudges” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) can then by potential powerful tools to shift 
decision making. A nudge is not a cash payment. It may consists, for instance of the provision of 
information about the social norm (about what others think or do), possibly in conjunction with a 
particular program. It can also simply consist of the way in which a choice is presented. Empirical 
evidence shows that nudges can be effective in changing consumer behavior, in particular pro-
environmental behaviors (see Schubert (2017) for a review). The question then arises: is it possible to 
nudge farmers to change their practices, and possibly adopt more pro-environmental (or “greener”) 
practices?  
There are indeed some reasons to believe that AES uptake could be improved with the use of nudges. 
Some studies suggest that nudges can affect farmers’ intentions to (re-)enroll in AES (Kuhfuss et al 
                                                          
2 Since 2008, the Dephy farm network of the French Ecophyto program has been experimenting with techniques that 
reduce the use of pesticides and herbicides. The dissemination of these innovative practices is a major challenge faced by 
the program. 
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2016; Chen et al 2009). There is also evidence of a “social identity” mechanism behind individual 
decisions (Goldstein et al 2008), by which an individual adheres to the descriptive norms of the group 
of which he considers himself a member. This effect may well apply to farmers, especially among 
members of a cooperative. Thus, there is reason to believe that this type of psychological lever could 
be useful in improving the design of agri-environmental policies. 
In recent years, behavioral economic research using lab experiments has grown rapidly and has 
provided evidence of a large number of tools that can be used to encourage green practices. Because 
these results cannot be directly extrapolated to the field, field experiments are often necessary to 
validate results derived from the lab. In this respect, the use of lab-in-the-field experiments seems 
appropriate as an intermediate step to undertake before implementing an RCT, as they can contribute 
to a better understanding of the role played by context, an essential consideration when implementing 
any field experiment. 
Despite a recent craze for nudges in both the academic and the public sphere (in UK and US in 
particular3), there are almost no experimental studies providing evidence of the impact of nudges on 
farmers’ decisions in the real world. One exception is a study by Messer et al. (2015), who ran a field 
experiment in which farmers from Texas, Delaware, and Maryland competed in an auction of 
conservation contracts that required them to adopt practices that reduced nutrient run-off. The 
authors show that changing the default option can result in larger bids, and that providing information 
about what others think of the required practice increases the likelihood that a producer participates 
in the auction. Wallander et al (2017) and Chabé-Ferret et al (2018) also use social norms in field 
experiments with the aim of inducing greater farmer participation in AESs, and they make use of RCTs 
to test the effectiveness of these nudges. Both studies failed to detect a statistically significant impact 
of these interventions on farmer participation in the AE schemes.  
Many alternative nudges remain to be tested in the field in order to improve the design of agri-
environmental policies. Ferraro et al. (2017), for example, suggest using a default option in order to 
increase farmer participation in the US Conservation Reserve Program. The authors also suggest 
presenting payments in agri-environmental programs using a loss frame, specifically by stating the 
maximum payment the participant could earn and how much he would lose for every practice not 
adopted. Both of these suggestions could also work in the European context. Previous evidence thus 
suggests that insights from behavioral sciences could indeed be used to improve the design of the 
second pillar of the CAP.  
                                                          
3 Several governments in developed countries have constituted ‘behavioral insights teams’ within their civil services. In 
2014, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) created the Center for Behavioral and Experimental Agri-Environmental 
Research (CBEAR). Galizzi (2017) also identifies initiatives by the governments of Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Singapore. 
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For a variety of information interventions or nudges, the evaluation of the scheme’s effectiveness using 
an RCT seems quite feasible, since large samples can be easily reached and the so-called Stable Unit 
Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) is likely to hold, at least in cases where the nudge or information 
is customized to each farmer. One limitation of such experiments, however, is that small (albeit 
valuable) effects may be hard to detect, as the record of the “What Works Centres” in UK shows. 
Another limitation is that the interpretation of these effects is not always straightforward in the 
presence of a variety of plausible “behavioral” models and heterogeneous types of behavior (e.g. Duflo 
et al., 2011). But even if the impact of information nudging is small, it may remain quite cost-effective, 
as these types of interventions tend to require very little in terms of implementation costs. This is all 
the more true in countries such as France, where the online application for agricultural subsidies has 
been mandatory since 2016, and the cost of providing information or nudges through pop-up windows 
in the Telepac website would thus be virtually zero.  
 
3. Incentives to coordinate: experimenting with collective bonuses 
 
Agri-environment schemes (AES) have become a key mechanism within the CAP for sustaining the 
environmental services provided by farmland. A number of different schemes have been put in place 
at the level of individual farms. However, the recent literature has emphasized the potential gains that 
could be realized by adopting an approach that is characterized by a larger, landscape-wide scale. 
Accordingly, AES compensation payments are now allowed by EU regulation to be paid to groups of 
farmers (Regulation N° 1305/2013, article 28, cited in Westerink et al., 2017). Such payments, often 
referred to as "collective bonuses", raise important design questions. Contract theory highlights the 
various potentially counterproductive mechanisms at play. An obvious rationale for setting incentives 
at the landscape level is that many of the outcomes for which the schemes are designed (e.g., wildlife 
conservation, water quality and storage) are also applicable at the landscape level. While actions at 
the individual farm level could certainly contribute to these objectives, their impact on landscape-level 
results would arguably be weaker, thus yielding imperfectly aligned incentives. Employing "multi-
tasking" models (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) may also induce farmers to focus on better-
incentivized tasks at the expense of other tasks that could be more important with respect to the 
environmental objectives identified. Collective bonuses can also create collective action problems, 
such as free-riding. The free-rider problem can, however, be mitigated to some extent by institutional 
arrangements or peer pressure. In short, the appropriate design of collective bonuses is a difficult 
theoretical question involving numerous plausible mechanisms whose effects may be context 
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dependent. Empirical evidence is needed in order to weigh the relative strengths of these mechanisms 
and to assess their net effect. Relatedly, given the evidence in several instances that incentives may 
have perverse effects, transparent and convincing evidence that collective bonuses have the expected 
positive effects in the contexts of interest will be key to their political viability. 
Although to our knowledge RCTs have not yet been used to evaluate agri-environmental schemes at 
the landscape level, two examples suggest that they may prove a useful tool in this regard. In Uganda, 
Jayachandran et al. (2017) analyze the impact of financial incentives for forest owners to maintain the 
integrity of their forestland, thus providing experimental evidence of the effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness of Payments for Ecosystem Services. Even though the incentives in this study are set at 
the farm level, where each individual is given the opportunity to enroll to receive payments if he 
refrains from clearing trees, the randomization of treatment assignments takes place at the village 
level such that the impacts that are measured encompass any "leakages" (externalities) and collective 
dynamics within villages. The authors also use random variation in the proximity between treatment 
and control villages to account for potential spillovers across villages. As a result, outcomes in this 
study are measured at the landscape level. Though there is no evidence of spillovers and limited 
evidence of leakages, program enrollment is low (32 percent), seemingly due to limited program 
awareness, leading the authors to question whether the program could be better marketed. Collective 
incentives could indeed be a way to do so, as they could induce farmers to advertise the program to 
other farmers in their village. In other words, everything in this experimental design is in place to 
analyze alternative collective schemes, and the results suggest that such schemes are indeed worth 
trying. 
The second example comes from the incentive literature in the economics of education. Quite 
naturally, given the collective nature of the education production function at the classroom and school 
level, researchers have been experimenting with various forms of individual and collective bonuses for 
teachers and students as incentives to increase student performance. Empirical evaluations in this 
literature underscore the complexity of the mechanisms at play, and specifically their dynamic nature. 
For instance, Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011) compare the effectiveness of teacher- and 
school-level incentives in India: while the two compare well in the first year, teacher-level incentives 
outperform school-level incentives in the second year, suggesting collective action problems might 
have come into play. Other systematic investigations such as those conducted by Roland Fryer or John 
List suggest that the literature in the economics of education remains on the steep segment of the 
learning curve regarding how to best harness the power of incentives in this area (e.g., Fryer et al., 
2012). Much could certainly be learned from similar efforts with respect to AES. 
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4. Fighting farmer poverty: experimenting with transfers?  
 
The first pillar of the CAP has long-consisted of direct payments to farmers, providing a safety net 
against volatile prices. Such subsidies are a core component of the CAP and are largely uncontested as 
a principle of the program. Prima facie, it may therefore appear that there is no useful role for RCTs in 
the evaluation of these policies. Yet beyond the normative questions regarding the principle of the 
payments per se, many questions exist regarding the specific design of the different interventions 
within the first pillar, over which member countries do exercise some degree of freedom.  Ensuring 
that transfers reach the targeted groups without inducing large efficiency losses matters for the 
sustainability of the CAP over the long term. The equity considerations underlying the payments of the 
first pillar are also receiving more attention given differences in allocations between older and newer 
member states. 
Incidentally, RCTs have proved to be a very useful tool in shedding light on the advantages and 
disadvantages of direct payments to farmers and other rural households in developing countries. The 
evaluation of a conditional cash transfer program in Mexico (PROGRESA, now named Prospera) was 
one of the first large-scale RCTs conducted in the developing world, and the experimental evidence of 
its impacts was crucial in assuring continued support through changing political climates. In fact, the 
program rapidly expanded nationwide in Mexico and triggered similar programs across Latin America, 
where they now reach 25 percent of the total population. Such programs have also spread to Africa, 
Asia, and even Europe and the United States over the last 20 years (Fizsbein and Schady, 2009;  Robles, 
Rubio and Stampini, 2015).  
The initial evaluation of the program in Mexico, which tested the effectiveness of one particular design, 
was followed by a large literature experimentally comparing alternative design variations. These 
studies helped policymakers understand, for instance, whether making transfers conditional, labeling 
them, or making them entirely unconditional impacted their effectiveness (Baird, Ozler and McIntosh, 
2011; Benhassine et al, 2015). They also tested whether varying the recipient in the household (men 
vs. women) affected outcomes (Akresh, de Walque and Kazianga, 2016; Almas et al 2018), and whether 
making payments conditional on actions or achievements was more effective (Barrera-Osorio et al, 
2011). Such studies have now been carried out in many different settings (e.g. Malawi, Morocco, 
Burkina Faso, Bosnia, Colombia), and frequently in close collaboration with government ministries. The 
agencies implementing these studies often have valid questions regarding how to optimally design a 
transfer program for a specific objective or context.  
Once it is acknowledged that the answers to such questions are not obvious beforehand, 
experimentation becomes an ethical policy procedure. While such RCTs do not call into question the 
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benefits themselves, nor the justification for the policy goals they aim to achieve, they are well suited 
to provide empirical evidence on potential trade-offs between different objectives that alternative 
design options may imply. Learning from these experiences suggests that RCTs have potential as useful 
instruments in comparing alternative direct payment schemes under the first pillar of the CAP, and in 
investigating how different designs may imply different trade-offs between the possible objectives 
therein.  
 
5. Targeting under adverse selection: experimenting with innovative 
agri-environmental contract designs  
 
Voluntary agri-environmental contracts that offer fixed payment schemes suffer from two major 
problems. First, farmers who face the lowest costs for complying with environmental requirements 
are more likely to enter the program; in cases where the program would pay some farmers for doing 
nothing differently from what they would have done in the absence of payment, adverse selection may 
induce large windfall effects (Chabé-Ferret and Subervie 2013). Second, those with the highest costs 
of participating are less likely to enter the program, though they are precisely those whose 
engagement would have the greatest contribution to the program’s effectiveness (Kuhfuss et al. 2014). 
One option for reducing the efficiency losses due to adverse selection is to shift from fixed payment 
schemes to auction mechanisms. Procurement auctions have been in place in other countries for many 
years (e.g. the US Conservation Reserve Program, established in the 1980s, as well as several pilot 
programs in Australia). However, the context in which conservation auctions are implemented may 
impact their effectiveness (Lundberg et al. 2018; Ferraro 2008). It is therefore impossible to anticipate 
the additional gains from auctions (compared to fixed payment contracts) in the European context; 
here again, RCTs could provide a useful way to address this question. 
For several decades, researchers have used experimental auctions to estimate consumer willingness-
to-pay for new products (Corrigan et al., 2009). In a demand-revealing auction mechanism similar to 
the Vickrey (1961) and Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) (1964) auctions, bids indeed provide a direct 
measure of auction participants' willingness-to-pay for the good being sold. There is a substantial 
literature dealing with the implementation of such designs in university experimental economics labs 
(Berry et al. 2015 and references therein). More recently, a number of studies in developing countries 
have also demonstrated that these insights can have broader relevance for addressing design trade-
offs in actual policy applications. Hoffmann, Barrett and Just (2009) used a BDM design to measure the 
gap between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept for bed nets in Uganda. Berry, Fischer and 
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Guiteras (2015) also use a BDM mechanism to estimate the willingness to pay for water filters in Ghana, 
while Guiteras and Jack (2017) use the same mechanism to investigate how workers respond to 
different contractual arrangements in the context of informal day labor markets in rural Malawi. 
Finally, and more closely related to the topic we address here, Jack (2013) uses a Vickrey auction to 
explicitly take into account landholders’ willingness-to-accept an afforestation contract in Malawi. She 
moreover runs a RCT to demonstrate that landholders who received a tree planting contract as a result 
of bidding in the auction kept significantly more trees alive over a three-year period than did 
landholders who received the contract through a lottery. Much would certainly need to be learned 
from a systematic analysis of the demand for AES in European countries, especially taking into account 
the heterogeneity that is likely to be present with respect to this demand.   
 
6. Concluding comments 
 
The lessons from this prospective exercise can be summarized as follows. First, many insights from 
laboratory experiments in the behavioral sciences could be used to improve the design of the second 
pillar of the CAP, and RCTs would be useful in evaluating how well these approaches can contribute to 
achieving higher participation rates in real world conditions. Second, the value of collective incentives 
is a challenging theoretical question due to the many mechanisms that are potentially at play in 
determining the ultimate impacts of these incentives. RCTs may therefore be of particular use in 
weighing the relative strengths of plausible mechanisms in specific field settings. Third, ensuring that 
transfers reach the targeted groups without inducing large efficiency losses is an important 
consideration in fostering the sustainability of the CAP; this question, too, can be usefully addressed 
by RCTs. Finally, the potential for adverse selection is high in current schemes where farmers receive 
the same payment regardless of the opportunity costs of conservation they face. Here again, 
experiments can be used for both eliciting individual willingness-to-accept an agri-environmental 
contract and for separately identifying the effects of farmer selection and payment on the provision of 
environmental services.  
In this paper, we strongly advocate for experimentation, aiming to demonstrate that RCTs have 
significant potential for improving the design of the CAP. We do not view RCTs as a way of evaluating 
the CAP per se, but rather as a tool for evaluating different design alternatives for which there are no 
obvious ex ante expectations. We moreover argue that RCTs could be used as a tool to test new 
schemes with complementary interventions in an effort to enable the CAP to reach its target audience 
and objectives.  
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The lack of studies on this topic may indicate the presence of political economic issues – such as the 
fear that the tool may do a disservice to its promoters and damage the credibility of CAP itself. In this 
context, it could be useful to follow the guidance offered by Campbell and Stanley (1969) in order to 
avoid such conflicts and misperceptions: real decisions often imply choosing between plan A and plan 
B rather than putting the global architecture of a policy in question; when such choices can be made 
following a documented and transparent process, the global architecture may be continuously 
improved, and the policy reinforced.  
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